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Abstract 
Based on case studies in former Portuguese colonies it is 
argued that development co-operation is a dissipative 
economy aiming primarily at the reproduction of the 
involved agencies which are dissipative structures, that 
is, depend on the organisation of a constant flux of 
energy. The auto·poetic constitution of the interplaying 
organisations imposes strong filters on the perception of 
the realities at the receiving end of the development eo· 
operation on all its agents. It is argued that evaluation is 
- at least in part - a ritualistic exercise intended to keep 
the aid money flowing in the interest of the agencies. 
Therefore evaluation efforts are put into an 
organisational straightjacket that keeps the blind spots 
firmly hidden. The development perspective as set by the 
organisations seriously limits evaluators by mechanisms 
of recruitment, training, field research conditions, 
reporting requirements and compensation. They learn 
how to ignore evidence in order not to jeopardize 
development theory. 
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Most evaluators would probably agree that the function of evaluation in 
development co-operation is to provide information and knowledge about 
the development efforts and their consequences for the developing 
countries. The evaluation feedback loop can be seen as one part of the 
circle that spans planning, funding, implementation and evaluation (as for 
example used in the project cycle). 
This paper1 argues that in some areas of Africa some of the basic 
underlying assumptions are not longer valid, if they ever were. 
Evaluation in development co-operation is part of a complex system that I 
will call dissipative economy2. 
In order to understand the role and function of evaluation we have to look 
at the environment and at the conditions that define its inner workings 
Or, to put in another way, we have to bring the observer into the picture, as 
Heinz von ?????????has argued in his second order cybernetics. 
Only in this way, with different perspectives of different observers, who all 
are part of the process, can we get a perspective on the blind spots in our 
observation. 
The following conclusions are drawn from long term research in 
Portuguese speaking African countries about development co-operation 
1 The results presented in this study were prodooed in a loog time reseen:h context. At the end 
of the seventies the fucus of the intaest was the development of post-colonial societies, in tbe 
eighties the research moved to the development potential of agrarian societies (Resear<:b project 
"Agrargesellschaften und Undlidle Entwicld~politik in Guinea-Bissau" at the lnstitut :fllr 
Soziologie der Universitlt MOnster, be8ded by Christian Sigrist and funded by Stiftung 
Volkswagenwerk). Then the research was organised by the Centro de Pesqisa, COPIN, Bissau. 
It was in part funded by DeWdJe Forschungsgcmeinsdlaft (DFG). 
The research followed the real developma:rts wbich invalidated the development paradigm and 
led to the research p~ect "Disintegnltioo of Agrarian Societies in Africa and Their Potential for 
RecoostJUction" at the CEA, ISCTE, Lisbon, funded by FCT, Lisbon, Portugal (Project 
PraxisfP/SOC/111 0/1998 I/ Poctii/Soc/1111 0/98). This projea includes fieldwork in Guioea-
Bissau. Mozambique and S. Tome and Principe. Now the problem oftnlumatised Afiialn 
societies oomes more into f~. 
2 See Schiefer (2002). 
3 See von Foerster (1994) 
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with agrarian societies in Africa4. While the conclusions might be limited 
to the case studies, the questions raised might apply to other countries too. 
Let us first have a look at some basic theoretical and strategic approaches: 
1) The development paradigm has already been challenged by reality. 
Some societies (not only states) do not develop; they are breaking down. So 
we should also question the development paradigm theoretically and 
practically5. 
2) The development paradigm obstructs diagnostics and assessments. How 
can we get a real picture of the societies if we look through a prism of 
development? Diagnostic has some very real blind spots6• Fundamental 
questions like magic are completely excluded. Another taboo concerns 
political power. Disintegration and collapse of societies do not enter the 
development debate yet. 
3) The upholding of the development paradigm against all evidence is a 
self-serving strategy of the agencies that are the dissipative structures of the 
dissipative economy. They need a constant flux of energy to stabilize their 
organisations. 
4) Where evidence of collapse of states gets too strong, development aid 
and development theory are temporarily suspended, emergency relief and 
4 For evi~ to support the conclusions presented here see Schiefer (2002), Temudo 
(1998a.b,c.d). Temudo and Schiefer (2002). 
5 Atteslander ( 1995: 12) raised the issue of collapsing societies: "It is not sociaJ change in itself 
which destabilizes coUective order but rather its monstrous aa:elcration which result from more 
disparate development processes. The inability to keep pace with change leads to crisis-laden 
collapses of order with entire societies." He takes up Durkheim's COIKlept of. ,.Anomie as a 
classical term means nonnlessness, lawlessness. no sense of social identity. being 'socially 
tau"' (Atteslandes' 1995:13). 
W lShlcke ( 1996) develops an all-encompassing theory of social entropy. 
Schiefcr (2002:33 pp) desaibes a ooncept ofsociaJ oollapse. ,Anomie is understood, in a notion 
derived from Durkheim, as a process that can be self-reinfurcing. This ' positive feedbaclc' can 
lead to a situation where anomic processes furthc:r other anornic processes and the societies in 
question can be drawn into a downward spiral of social disintegration." 
6 Fuodamental questions like magic are completely excluded. Another taboo ooncems political 
power. 
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rehabilitation take there place, until development agencies and 
development theory come back to reclaim their terrain. 
5) The collapse of societies does not seem to get as much attention as the 
collapse of states. International agencies seem to feel stronger about their 
'~development partner institutions" ceasing to function completely then 
about societies falling apart. They never deal with them without an 
interface anyway. 
6) The refusal to transfer resources to the poor is one of the very few 
principles of development aid that all members of all agencies who are 
structurally dependent on the flow of aid agree upon. It simply states, that 
everybody taking part in the development co-operation may receive a 
bigger or smaller share of the funds, but that nothing may be handed over 
to the poor. 
This is justified by not wishing to create a "beggar's mentality" and 
dependency of the so-called target groups. Worries about the dependency 
of the agencies seem to be much less in evidence. Direct transfer to the 
poor might reduce the organisations' share in the business of the dissipative 
economy. 
7) This rule to forbid transfers to the poor makes it nearly impossible to 
reduce poverty in trawnatised societies without proper resources. 
8) Dissipative economy not only serves to keep the development agencies 
afloat, it also is the basis for the appropriation model of (mostly urban) 
power elites that destabilizes many African political systems. The fight for 
the control over external (development) resources is at the origin of many 
power struggles in Africa. 
9) The dissipative economy also creates a secondary economy that 
increases transaction costs7, and that suffocates the local economy. 
1 Wiesncr (1998:108pp) in Picciotto; Wiesnet (1998). 
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10) It also contributes to the erosion of the agrarian societies (in many 
African countries the only societies with an orientation to production and a 
proper if weakening productive base), and to the destruction of many 
• African systems of kinship and marriage'. 
It contributes to the general collapse not just of state institutions but also of 
social institutions. It contributes to the reduction of productive capacity and 
the loss of potential for self-organisation and ofsocialisation, that is, the 
transmission of productive and social potential between generations. 
11) For a considerable time the development agencies have tried to 
dissimulate the poor shape of national "development partner institutions"8, 
frrst by swinging between different partners (from state to the private sector 
and to the civil society) then by simulating the interface required to 
guarantee the flux of development aid themselves - that is by acting the part 
of the receiving end of the development aid too. 
12) The shift of the watering can to civil society, which in most theoretical 
and practical approaches strangely excludes traditional societies, organised 
along the lines of kinship, clan, ethnicity and similar principles, has created 
rapid growth of civil society organisations that follow only three 
organisational principles: self-organisation, communication capacity and 
capacity to mobilise external resources9• 
Let us now look at some specific points of current development co-
operation debate and how basic principles are translated in to operations: 
8 It is mnarkable bow absent thorougb organisational analysis of development partner 
organisations are. Only gradually tbis taboo seems to be broken and the analytical and 
methoOOlogical instruments are coming forward. See Pi~otto (1998) and Feinstein (2001). 
9 Schiefer (2002:237pp). 
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13) Good governance and the other criteria imposed on the countries at the 
receiving end of development co-operation are beautiful principles, but 
they exclude precisely the societies from the aid that need it most, namely 
the societies without public ????????????????before, during or after wars or 
societies suffering from bad regimes. Mostly they are not applied anyway, 
as decision making processes are very slow, inefficient and hampered by 
interest groups. 
14) The separation between emergency relief, rehabilitation and 
development co-operation by different mechanisms and agencies for 
funding, for implementation and methodology divides processes that at 
least in traumatised societies should belong together. 
15) Support for self-help as a criterion for funding assumes a potential in 
the societies that specifically the most affected simply often do not have 
anymore. 
16) Sustainability, which on the implementation level is aimed at through 
project ownership, leads to the creation of local partner organisations. In 
societies with a low organisational potential this is another nearly 
impossible task for the agencies. So in many cases, phoney local 
organisations are set up and kept at life artificially on the drip. The short 
term ideology of the exit strategy inspired by the Powell doctrine, which 
forces organisations to hand over projects after one cycle, hinders the 
building of a self-supporting and healthy organisational landscape. 
17) The imposed strategy to create local partner organisations induces 
organisations to all kinds of deception and duplicity which handicap not 
only newly established organisations. 
18) Gender equality is also a beautiful principle. In fact in many societies 
women are seriously disadvantaged. In practice, however, the 
implementation of development projects along gender lines can introduce 
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new fault lines into social structures and weaken the communities, which 
also provide women with shelter, protection and opportunities. 
19) Target groups are quite often defined according to abstract criteria, thus 
isolating groups from the social structures they belong to or are supposed to 
be re-integrated into. 
20) The consultancy principle in bilateral and multilateral development co-
operation means in practice that real decision·making power is split 
between representatives of the state and international agencies. The 
international project co-ordinator usually controls only formal funding 
procedures. This usually leads to a situation where the blocking power of 
national decision makers is used to appropriate funds and other project 
inputs in one way or the other10• This approach presumes the existence of a 
state and of a public administration. This is rather unrealistic because the 
state, or more specifically its institutions - mostly falling apart and propped 
up by external agencies to guarantee a semblance of functioning - quite 
often are the main obstacle to development. In many cases the state is 
dysfunctional and in many areas of the countryside, simply non-existent. 
21) The collective approach which results in a necessity to create an 
interface organisation (village co-operative, farmers' association, women's' 
groups, etc) is universally applicable. It frees the development 
organisations from the obligation to know about local societies and to treat 
local institutions as serious partners. This approach also puts the local 
quasi-modern development agencies into a vantage position, because they 
supposedly master the modem or quasi-modem forms of communication 
this kind of organisation requires better than the "target groups". 
22) The participative approach has nowadays become nearly mandatory. It 
does however work only under very specific conditions, which presuppose 
organisational knowledge, capacity for interaction, capacity for 
10 See Schiefer (2002:200pp) 
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articulation, and experience in handling "development" of the target 
groups 11• In societies, where repression is strong, this model does not work. 
In traumatised societies it works only under very specific circumstances. 
This approach, fuelled by the enthusiasm of worlc:shops facilitators the 
world over. ignores that important aspects of reality (such as magic, power 
relations, etc) in traumatised societies are treated as secrets and will not be 
brought up in workshops. 
23) Market economy is a difficult approach in societies that lack all its 
economic, institutional, infrastructural, social and normative prerequisites. 
24) The sector wide approach (SWAP) (introduced by the EU and other 
donors) tries to overcome the difficulties of the project approach. It is 
however oriented less at reality but a functional differentiation of an often 
either non-existent or not working public administration. 
25) The wild organisational landscape often includes organisations with 
different and disparate target groups, methodological approaches and 
haphazard distribution in space. If we imagine the allocation of funding of 
donor organisations as a filter system that works on different levels, we 
have to look at the confluence of political principles, selection criteria and 
implementation decision of: 
a) The big international donor organisations 
b) The national donor organisations 
c) The international NGO 
d) The local representatives of international NGO 
e) The national NGO of the north 
f) The local representatives of the national NGO ofthe north 
h) The national governments divided into functional but not functioning 
ministries 
ll See Milando (2002). 
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i) The provincial governments divided into functional but not functioning 
delegations of the ministries 
j) The different local authorities. 
This filter-system does not produce rational decisions but rather haphazard 
and arbitrary allocation of development resources. 
28) The usual multiple sources funding is a technique used by donor 
organisations to spread responsibility and risks. The implementing agencies 
use it to avoid dependencies on one source of funding and to reduce their 
risk of survival as organisations. This technique adds an additional touch of 
complexity, which slows down the decision-making processes and keeps 
people busy with administration. 
29) The project approach. The ovenvhelming part of development co-
operation is planned, implemented and evaluated in the form of projects. 
The project form is universally used in all spheres of activity. It combines a 
number of instruments that are very well known and tested and mastered by 
many people. 
In the context we discuss here this fonn brings, however, a series of 
problems. For the implementing agency it is imperative to produce a 
success in project implementation at all costs, even at the cost of 
dishonesty, which usually fits only too well into the general environment. 
In many cases further funding and often the survival of the implementing 
agency depends on the project's success or at least the semblance of it. As 
success in this area is a fleeting gazelle, this induces organisations to fraud, 
which is structural for the whole setting. 
Projects usually have a cycle that spans two or three years, after a 
preparation phase of about one year. This limitation of duration often limits 
the building of trust between target groups and project personnel, as in 
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African societies, mostly low trust societies12, especially so if traumatised, 
trust is mostly trust in people and not in quasi-modem institutions. 
The limitation of the duration also increases the chances of political actors 
to set development agencies against each other for personal gain. 
Many agencies, especially the smaller ones, need projects for their own 
survival. Therefore they often act in an opportunistic fashion when faced 
with opportunities to get funding for projects. They often give more 
attention to funding than to realistic implementation. The short-term 
ideology hampers implementation in dynamic contexts (breakdown 
processes are dynamic too). 
Projects are mostly limited to specific sectors, limited in time and in 
territorial range, and usually fraught with methodology for implementation. 
The project form is external to African agrarian societies and poses real 
difficulties of communication. 
30) Personnel. The short term approach and the need to produce successes 
which is embedded in the project structure, carries over to the project 
personnel, whose contracts often match the duration of the project, and thus 
hampers long-term perspectives and long term thinking. The frequent 
change of personnel also thwarts the production of specific expertise in a 
given area and the growing of a memory in organisations and in the 
organisational landscape as a whole. 
The frequent rotation of personnel - designed originally in the 
administrative, military and diplomatic services - in the development 
setting increases the long-term tolerance of frustration levels. Development 
personnel always can be sure to change their posts and can always hope 
that the new posting might be better than the actual one. After a few cycles 
on the lower levels (NGO etc) many manage to get into better positions 
with national or international organisations. There their frustrated idealism 
12 See Fukuyama ( 1995). Luhmann (1989). 
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gives way to a cynicism that rises proportionally with their income. 
Cheerfulness and vivacity are real social resources in African agrarian 
societies - in project staff they are mostly absent. 
31) Plarming methods. Most project planning methods are based on 
causality. Where causalities are difficult to identify - as in breaking down 
societies - because too many factors come into the play, the standardised 
planning techniques don't work very well. The currently applied planning 
techniques are not well suited to the context discussed here. They don't 
allow for fast adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances nor do they 
permit the adaptation of goals, inputs and methods. They usually put all 
people involved into a behavioural straightjacket that often causes strong 
frictions with the environment with correspondingly high levels of 
frustration of the project staff, not to speak of the frustrations of the other 
people involved. 
32) Target, target groups, logical framework, PERT, strategy, intervention, 
exit strategy, there seems to be a proper lend and lease scheme in place, 
where development theory borrows from military theory. In part directly, in 
part through the world of business, development theory has imported 
concepts and techniques from the military that dominate the development 
intervention. Often the mostly pacifist protagonists don't seem to be aware 
of the fact. From the design of the strategy to the organisation of the 
development intervention the military doctrine of the west is very much in 
evidence. The changes in military doctrine of the last two centuries reflect 
clearly on the organisational level of development intervention. Where in 
former times the general commanded his troops in the field, we have now 
central organisations with their staffs that do the advance planning and take 
the decisions and then send their troops into the field from their 
headquarters. But there are all too many headquarters sending off their 
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troops who then in the field meet or more often miss each other when 
allegedly fighting the same enemy. 
The local populationy divided into target groups, but without really 
understanding what this impliesy is exposed to the unfettered onslaughts of 
outposts -all anned with different discourses and intervention 
methodologies - of quite a few different salvation armies. 
What are the different forces which influence evaluation of development 
aid in Africa? What is the topography of the terrain the evaluators work in? 
Two basic tenets make up the consensus of the "development community" 
which defines the framework for evaluation13: 
• The flux of international aid must not be reduced and if possible 
increased. 
• The aid resourees must be controlled by the organisations that handle 
them. 
Inside this framework there is a struggle for power going on - not just 
between north and south - but between the donor organisations, the 
international development agencies and the national agencies of the north 
and the power elites of quite often disintegrating political systems and the 
local development agencies of the south supposedly trying to produce 
development for - ever more disintegrating - societies. 
Power translates into control over development resomces. So evaluation 
can be used as additional leverage to increase the power of donor agencies 
as their results may be used to cut off funding or impose conditions on the 
implementing agencies and of the countries of the south. 
13 We are looking lit external conditions fur the work of evaluators- net 11t indi\'idual behaviour. 1t is 
certainly not intended to doubt the quality and the high professiooal aod ethical standards of most 
evaluators. 
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The power elites of the south do not want to have their power challenged, 
which means, they are not keen to see their appropriation model unravel. 
They have generally no interest in evaluation at all and see it mostly as an 
imposition of donors on their freedom to dispose of the resources at their 
will. 
What are the general strategies that answer these requirements? 
1) No evaluation at all. Probably still the most frequent fonn of evaluation 
in development 
2) Formalistic, administrative evaluation, usually the filling in of some 
forms and the production of some formalised report. 
3) Ritualistic evaluation. An art form, where all the evaluation ingredients 
are present, but the evaluation results are more or less defmed in advance. 
4) Killer evaluation, when a funding agency has decided to move out and 
needs a justification to do that. 
5) Evaluation to produce authenticity, usually positioned somewhere on an 
axis between learning and accountability. Different theoretical approaches 
and methodologies are available including highly sophisticated models to 
increase the complexity of the whole process. 
They are usually undertaken in an organisational programme or project 
perspective14• As evaluation is conditioned to produce results which do not 
challenge the basic assumptions mentioned above, evaluation results come 
more or less in the form of: yes there are serious problems, but there also is 
hope and some very positive indicators. More funding is needed to 
overcome the obstacles . .. . 
6) Sector wide or national evaluations. These macro-evaluations are usually 
paid for by the big donor organisations and - at least the published ones -
14 See Feinstein (200 I). 
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present carefully optimistic results which require more inputs in order to 
reach the development goals. 
7) In field evaluations in a long tenn perspective say in an area based 
approach are very rare 15• They might show the chaos produced by the 
multiple uncoordinated approaches of a great nwnber of development 
organisations in the same teiTain and the absurdity of the system. They 
might also show that development operations actually weaken the agrarian 
societies they are supposed to develop. 
The diversity of organisational approaches and the resulting complexity of 
the development co-operation are not problems waiting for a quasi 
imminent solution, but structural ingredients of the dissipative economy. 
So the basic approach to evaluation will most likely continue to be in an 
organisational and project perspective -justified by the wish '1o see what 
results have been produced with the resources" in order to maximise future 
resource allocation. 
For the theoretical and methodological approaches of evaluation the 
diversity of the organisational landscape of development will be 
reproduced in the field, adding another layer of complexity to the whole 
business. 
Different schools of evaluation thinking and different groups of evaluators 
will continue to compete for part of the resources. 
If the fight for development resources is anything to go by, the lines of 
battle might be perceived technical competence and independence of 
international experts against perceived specific local knowledge of national 
experts. 
u Some calls can already be heard See Feinstein (1998). 
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Starting from the conditions and constraints they are working under two big 
groups of evaluators can be distinguished: African experts working locally 
and nationally and international experts. 
Both groups work under ever more difficult conditions. On the operational 
level it becomes ever more difficult to do resean;h. The collapse of basic 
infrastructure, the deteriorating of local organisations and the increase of 
violence increase insecurity and reduce the efficiency of evaluation 
research. 
These difficulties usually keep the - international but also the mostly urban 
based national - evaluators restricted to centres with a minimum of 
infrastructures. Their forays into the countty-side are usually very short 
ventures. 
African evaluators suffer from a lack of resources. There are very few of 
them and mostly they have no (non-third-world and development) 
evaluation culture to draw from. As their number is fairly restricted they 
are usually overburdened by solicitations. Often they are put under the 
same time restrictions as international experts. In general, their financial 
and operational resources are, however, very scarce and it is very difficult 
for them to get training and access to intellectual resources. 
For African evaluators the risks are increasing- the absence of an 
evaluation culture makes it very difficult to use evaluation as instruments to 
influence decisions and to conquer the space and the resources necessary 
for evaluation that goes beyond the ritualistic exercise to fulfil donor 
requirements. Many of them share the view that the inflow of resources 
into their countty should not be put into jeopardy. On the other hand, it is 
very difficult for them to ignore the networks they are worldng and living 
in and the pressures that are being brought to bear on them by their 
families, organisations, friends and political masters. They are mostly 
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aware of the dangers and therefore reluctant (and rightly so) to state 
uncomfortable truths. 
So extra - evaluation considerations might have a high influence on their 
fmdings. In an environment of ever growing uncertainty and insecurity, 
they are always running a risk of catching a bullet or a curse • which might 
be worse. 
International evaluators often find that their sophisticated methodology 
simply is not realistic under the time constraints and operational conditions 
they are forced to work in. The operational conditions usually do not allow 
for the application of their research methodology as required. Quite often 
their research methodology is not the most appropriate to the cultural, 
social and operational context16• Even the participatory approach is no 
guarantee for true results, as in many African cultures discourse is an art 
form of social interaction, where the communication of mere facts may be 
the least important component. 
Quite often they have a restricted perception of reality seen through the 
perspective of the development paradigm, with Wlderlying theoretical, 
ideological, political and emotional dimensions and implications. 
As the evaluators are under pressure to fulfil their tenns of reference they 
have strong incentives to fudge, using second hand data of tmcertain origin 
-thus turning the grey literature ever more grey in the process. They are 
also quite often set up by scenarios created by the local agencies17• 
Bound by their agency ' s organisation perspective, normally evaluating just 
one programme or project - they do not see or at least not take into their 
16 For details of field research un<kr difficult conditions see Schiefer (1995) and (2002:281pp). 
17 Temudo (1998), Schiefer (2002). 
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official account the chaos produced by the multiplicity of development 
agencies active in the field. 
They mostly have some perception of their clients• expectations and of the 
general consensus they might not wish to challenge, so their fmdings are 
often influenced by ex1raneous considerations. 
In general they are adding to the complexity of the process on a perceived 
high level of technical competence which is however quite often restricted 
to data treatment, as the data collection under extreme conditions is getting 
more and more problematic. 
As their African colleagues, the international evaluators, even if they 
manage to avoid all the pitfalls and entrapments, have to face up to a nearly 
unsolvable dilemma: report true findings and thus put and end to the flow 
of money which will punish the local agencies and the populations alike 
(and might make more difficult to get another commission) or to look the 
other way and hope that time, increased efforts and resources may 
eventually bring improvements in service delivery, efficiency and impact 
and might even improve the living condition of the population. 
DRAFT Please do not quote without permission schiefer@iscte.pt 18 
Bibliography 
Atteslander. Peter (1995), Introduction. In: AuesJander, P. (ed.), ''Anomie. Social 
destabilization and the development of early warning systems," Intemntional Journal of 
Sociology and Social Policy, lS (8-10), 9-23. 
Feinstein, N.Osvaldo and Picciotto, Robert (ed.) (2001) Evaluation and Poverty Reduction. 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J. 
Foerster, Heinz von (1994) Wissenschaftdes Unwiflbaren, in: Fedrowitz, J.; Marejovski, D.; 
Kaiser, G. Neuroworlds. Gehim, Geist, Kultur. Frankfurt a. M., Campus. 
Fulruyama, Francis (1996) Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Free 
Press Paperbacks. New York. 
INEP (ed.) (2000), Soronda, Special issue 7 (June). INEP, Bissau. 
Long, Nonnan; Long, Ann (ed.)(l992) The Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of 
Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development. London, Routledge. 
Lubmann, Niklas (1989) Vertrauen: ein Mechanimws der Reduktion sozialer Komplexitiit. 
Stuttgart, Enke. 
Merton, Robert K. (1957), .. Social structure and anomie." In: Social Theory and Social 
Structure, rev. and enl. ed., Glencoe, The Free Press, 131-60. 
Milando, Joio (2002) 0 desenvolvimento participativo em contextos adversos: aspectos 
africanos. (Ph.D. Diss.). 
Picciotto, Robert; Wiesner, Eduardo (1998) Evaluation &: Ikvelopment. The Institutional 
Dimension. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers. 
Richards, Paul ( 1994 ), ''Local knowledge formation and validation: the case of rice in central 
Sieml Leone." In: Scoones, lan and Thompson, John (eds.), Beyond farmer first. London, ITP, 
39-43. 
Rudebeck, Lars (2001 ), On democracy's Sustainability, Stockholm, Sida-Studies. 
Schiefer, Ulricb (1986), Guinea-Bissau zwischen Weltwirtschaft und Subsistenz. 
Transatlantische Struktunn an der oberen Guinea Kiiste. Bonn, ISSA-
Scbiefer, Ulricb (1995), Macbt, Praxis, Sinn. Anmerkungen zur empiriscben Sozialforscbung 
in Afrika Peripherie 57158, 112-136. 
DRAFI' Please do not quote without permission schiefer@iscte.pt 19 
Scbiefer, Ulrich (2002). Ouinea-Bissau: Entwicklungspolitik nnd der Zusammenbruch 
afrikanischer Gesellschaften, IAK. Hamburg. [V on alien 8uten Geistem verlassen? Dissipative 
Okonomie: Entwicldungs-zusam~Mnarbeit und der Zusammenbruch afrihmischer 
Gesellschaften. Eine Fall-Studie zu Guinea-Bi.ssau Habilitationdissertation UniversitaetMiinster, 
1999). 
Schiefer, l.nrich and Philip J. Havik (1993), "lntrodu~io. In: O livcira, 0. et al. (ec:l.), 
Armazenamento tradicional na Guini-Bissau. Lisbon, MOnster, Copin. 
Sigrist, Christian (1994), Regulierte Anarchie. Untersuchungen zum Fehlen und VJ.r 
Entstehung politischer Herrschaft in segmen.tiiren Gesellschaften Afrikas. 3rd ed. , Hamburg, 
EVA. 
Sigrist, Christian (1994), Ethnizjtiit als Selbstorganisation. In: Ko8ler, Reinhart and Tilman 
Scbiel Nationo!Jtaat und Ethnizitiit, Frankfurt, IKO, 45-55. 
Temudo, Marina P. (1998a+b+c+d), lnovarilo e mudanfa em sociedades rurais a.fricanas. 
Gestiio dos recursos naturaiJ, saber locale instituiriJes de desenvolvimento induzMo. Vol. I, 
ll,ID,IV, Lisbon, ISA (Ph.D.Diss.). 
Temudo, M. P. and Schiefer, U. (2001) Ober die Belastbark.eit afrikanischer 
Agrargesellschaften in Kriegszeiten. Eine Fallstudie Uber die Aufnahme von StadtflUchtlingen 
im SUden von Guinea-Bissau. In: Peripherie, 84, Frankfurt, 70-96. 
W6hlcke, Manfrcd (1996), Soziale Entropie. MUncben, Deutscber Taschenbnchverlag. 
------·-·-·-----------·---__.---------------·-----------------------------------------
DRAFT Please do not quote without permission 
Contact of the author: 
Prof. Dr. U1rich Schiefer 
lScrE 
Av. Fo~Armadas 100 
P 1649-026 Lisboa 
Portugal 
Email: schiefer(aliscte. pt .. 
URL: www.iscte.pt 
Fax:+ 351 21 9055361 
Tel: + 351 21 75756599 
schiefer@iscte.pt 20 
